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Rhetoric and Reality in Early American Legal History:
A Reply to Gordon Wood
Alison L. LaCroixt
INTRODUCTION
I thank Gordon Wood for his substantive engagement with the
arguments in my book, and I welcome the opportunity to exchange
views on these major historical and historiographical issues with one
of the most important living US historians. There are many places in
which we agree, although these might be obscured by the sharp tone
of his review. But there are also many points on which we disagree,
and I am eager to address those issues.
Wood misstates the main argument of my book. My claim, in its
strongest form, is that the debates of the 1760s through the 1780s
culminated in a new constitutionalization of federalism, a process that
continued into the 1800s. From a disconnected and sometimes
ambiguous set of arguments about divided sovereignty in politics,
American colonists and early republicans fashioned a new
architecture of legal and constitutional authority built on a subjectmatter division of governmental power. In contrast to earlier
systems-whether formal or informal-of polycentric government,

the federalism of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
United States was specifically designed to avoid the ancient problem
of imperium in imperio, or dominion within a dominion, that had so
troubled the British Atlantic political world for decades. The
significant innovation of the American federal idea was to authorize
the division of sovereignty and to create viable legal categories that
could contain multiple sources of governmental power within one
overarching system.'
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The intellectual energy of American political and legal thinkers
between 1780 and 1800 was thus devoted to a project of translation
between political debates and constitutional structure. These
statesmen and theorists sought to translate the political conditions of
multiple governmental authorities that the colonists had both
experienced and theorized under the British Empire into a
constitutional structure. This constitutional structure would, they
believed, not simply conform to orthodox imperial legal theory
through a series of workarounds or legal fictions, but would instead
reshape some basic premises of that orthodoxy by rejecting unitary
sovereignty in favor of a deep-seated commitment to multiple sources
of sovereignty.
In this project of translation, federal theorists such as John
Dickinson, John Adams, James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander
Hamilton, John Marshall, and others joined experience and theory
into a new constellation of operative legal categories. The new
constitutional structure celebrated its multiplicity, with the text of the
Constitution beating an insistent refrain of overlap, duality, and
tension between the states and the general government. The founding
document, which both ratified and created the new frame of
government, outlined a novel scheme of authority in which the subject
of governmental action, not only the actor itself, was the relevant
focus for determining legality. Hence the attention to specific
categories of subject matter for governmental action: "commerce,"
"taxation," "treaties, alliances, and confederations." The new republic
would escape the imperium in imperio trap by apportioning the
powers of government-the subject matters of jurisdiction-between
the state and general levels of government. Building on the colonial
distinction between internal and external regulation, these thinkers
moved beyond previous decades' obsession with identifying a single
proper source of political sovereignty and instead reframed the debate
around an ideological commitment to a new federal structure, the
principal mission of which was to draw the line between the
regulatory power of the states and that of the general government
while endorsing the importance of each as a distinct sphere of
authority.
The localism that Wood insists was central to instilling the
colonists with proto-federal beliefs was but one part of a larger,
multilayered architecture of governmental authority. Rather than a
period in which long-established colonial practices of town and county
autonomy were recast as popular sovereignty in order to be slotted
2

See id at 41-44.
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into an existing "logic of sovereignty,"' my claim is that the 1770s and
1780s were a time of intense creativity in American constitutional
thought. It was not the case that American theorists spent these
decades with the ultimate goal of satisfying William Blackstone's
theory of unitary sovereignty and that a byproduct of those efforts
was a system that only later became preoccupied with the division
between sovereigns. The system that they designed was in fact
preoccupied with precisely this division.
A view that focuses entirely on unitary sovereignty in this way
risks becoming a functionalist account of how political and legal ideas
emerge: the Founders' radicalism did not extend to challenging the
post-Glorious Revolution orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty, so
they needed to find a unitary sovereign, so they cast around, found
the ideas of popular sovereignty that had been present in AngloAmerican political thought since at least the early seventeenth
century, and thereby solved the problem of imperium in imperio. But
arguments from necessity (people needed a certain idea, so they
invented that idea) are an odd version of intellectual history,
especially from a scholar widely recognized as one of the leading
proponents of a form of history that takes ideas seriously.4
My contention is that the Founders rejected the premise of
Blackstonian unitary sovereignty, and that their and their colonial
forebears' experience with local self-governance was only a part of
their broader and-as the debates of the 1760s and 1770s revealedhighly unorthodox vision of governmental authority as capable of
division according to the activities, persons, or objects being
regulated.! American federal theorists believed that as long as the
various imperia were demarcated as the specific domains of either
federal or state power (treaties, customs duties, and commerce among
the states on the one hand; appointment of presidential electors,
selection of US senators, and general police powers on the other),
they did not present the type of threat that had so worried Blackstone
and theorists such as colonial undersecretary William Knox. The
members of the Founding generation viewed their task as
accommodating the multiple authorities under which they and their
3
Gordon S. Wood, Book Review, Federalismfrom the Bottom Up, 78 U Chi L Rev 705,
722 (2011).
4
See, for example, Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787
viii (North Carolina 1998) ("In essence, republicanism was the ideology of the Enlightenment.").
Consider Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 8
(North Carolina 1980) (citing Wood, along with Bernard Bailyn and J.G.A. Pocock, as setting a
scholarly agenda that treats "'republicanism' as a distinctive universe (or 'paradigm') of thought
and discourse that gave shape to contemporary perceptions of the American Revolution").
5 LaCroix, IdeologicalOrigins at 126 (cited in note 1).
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predecessors had lived: the town meeting, the county court, the colony
and state, and the imperial and general governments. They therefore
understood their task not to be coming to terms with Blackstone's
unitary sovereignty but creating a new conception of governmental
structure that would both make sense of their own experience and rise
to the level of the English, Scottish, and Continental political theory
that they had long studied.!
Wood and I disagree about several important elements of
Revolutionary and early republican political and legal theory-in
particular, and as I discuss below, the relationships between law and
social practice and between ideas and experience. These are scholarly
disagreements, and they are important. Yet our accounts are not
incompatible, despite the apparent determination to find disagreement
that Wood's review displays.
I. FACTS
Before addressing the substantive issues on which Wood and I
disagree, I must first correct some mistaken assertions in his review.
As I will demonstrate, many of the asserted missing pieces are in fact
covered in the book. A few other issues are not discussed in the text
because they are not, in my view, relevant to the story of federalism's
development.
First, Wood states that my book "never acknowledges that the
American colonists from the very beginning of their settlements in the
seventeenth century were thoroughly familiar with the dividing and
apportioning of political power."' In fact, Chapter 1 of the book
begins by noting that many of the antecedents of eighteenth-century
federal thought dated from seventeenth-century Anglo-American
constitutional debates.! Page 12 contains the following observation:
"The lived constitutional experience of many colonists involved
multiple lawmaking bodies. For many North Americans, the most
significant laws touching everyday activities emanated from their
towns or colonial assemblies, not from Parliament or the Privy
Council."' Wood's assertion is simply incorrect. Indeed, I agreealthough perhaps not violently enough for Wood's taste, as in my
6
For a persuasive argument that scholars' emphasis on Blackstone's influence on the
Founders has obscured other sources of legal theory, and that early eighteenth-century Scottish
legal thought had particular importance for the structural provisions of the Constitution, see
generally James E. Pfander and Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv L
Rev 1613 (2011).
7
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 710 (cited in note 3).
8 LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 11 (cited in note 1).

9

Id at 12.
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discussion of the Iroquois Confederacy-that the colonists'
experience of divided authority was essential for the development of
federal thought.
Second, in another mischaracterization of my argument, Wood
maintains that "[ajlthough LaCroix mentions the New England
Confederation, she never explains its background. Indeed, she never
acknowledges that the idea of parceling out authority from the
bottom up-creating different levels of government-was very much

a part of American experience from the beginning."" I must confess
myself mystified at this dogged misreading of the book. Pages 20-22
of the book discuss the New England Confederation of 1643 in some
detail, explaining that the drafters intended the agreement as a "firm
and perpetual league of friendship and amity" for the purposes of
"preserving and propagating the truth and liberties of the Gospel and
for their own safety and welfare."" As for the parceling out of
authority "from the bottom up," the book clearly emphasizes the
point that confederations among colonies were premised on the
colonists' belief that they could themselves legitimately constitute
governmental authority.1 2
Third, in his lengthy section on representation, which Wood
includes as part of his longer discussion of popular sovereignty (which
I treat at length below"), Wood states that I "ignore[]" the distinctions
between actual and virtual representation. While it is true that the
book does not explicitly discuss these theories, it is not the case that
they have been ignored. The representation question was certainly
important for many of the actors I discuss, but I chose to focus on
another limiting argument that the colonists used to cabin Parliament:
the distinction between internal, colonial taxes or legislation and
external, empire-wide regulation. Both strategies were attempts to
redefine the power of Parliament- although, as I discuss below,
Wood and I disagree about the range and breadth of possible reforms
available to the colonists. Given his emphasis on local legislative
autonomy, Wood's focus on representation makes sense, but it is not
necessary to my account of structural multiplicity.
Fourth, Wood states that I "scarcely acknowledge[] the existence
of William Knox's ministerial pamphlet of 1769 ... even though it was
the most important statement of the official British position in the

10 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 715 (cited in note 3) (citation omitted).
11 LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 21 (cited in note 1).
12
13
14

Id at 20.
See Part II.A.
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 717 (cited in note 3).
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entire period."" This is, like many of Wood's claims, an exaggerated
and overly categorical critique. On pages 52, 63, and 122, and in a
footnote on page 243, the book provides several extended quotations
from Knox's pamphlet and portrays him as one of the major
exponents of the metropolitan perspective on the imperial
constitution. Wood would presumably prefer more discussion of Knox
because he believes that, along with Blackstone's views on
sovereignty, Knox's theories amounted to orthodoxy that the colonists
had no choice but to adopt. I disagree.
Fifth, although Wood dismisses the Articles of Confederation as
simply an application of long-established local autonomy ("forming
the Articles of Confederation posed no great theoretical problems"),
a few lines later he nevertheless suggests that my account spends too
little time on them." In fact, Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion
of the Articles, describing their content and situating them in the
broader context of colonial attempts at union dating from the early
seventeenth century. Moreover, had Wood attended to footnote 58 on
page 261, he might not have been so quick to assert that "[s]he does
not seem to realize that the Confederation Congress was merely a
replacement for the Crown."1 7 That note contains a lengthy discussion
of Jerrilyn Green Marston's King and Congress, including the
following observation: "Marston argues that the text vested the
Confederation Congress with many of the most important executive
functions for which the Crown had formerly been responsible.""
Sixth, in a moment of constitutional formalism, Wood states that
"LaCroix never mentions" Article I, § 10 of the Constitution." This is
an important omission, he feels, because the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention regarded § 10's list of prohibitions on state
power as "the replacement for Madison's veto."20 As the Convention
debates demonstrate, however, many delegates viewed the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review as the most important substitute for
Madison's proposal to give Congress the power to negative state laws.
When they discussed Article I, § 10, they regarded it as a legislationfocused complement to the Supremacy Clause's judicial mechanism of
keeping the states in check.2 Wood's insistence that Article I, § 10

Id at 720.
Id at 724-25.
17 Id at 724.
18 LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 261 n 58 (cited in note 1), discussing Jerrilyn Greene
Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer of PoliticalLegitimacy, 1774-1776 205 (Princeton 1987).
19 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 726 (cited in note 3).
20
Id.
21 See LaCroix, Ideological Originsat 163 (cited in note 1).
15
16
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replaced Madison's negative suggests that he has conflated the
Founders' debate over the rules by which subject matter was to be
allocated with their institutional debate over how those rules would
be enforced. But it was through their treatment of the institutional
question that the Founders translated their commitment to
multiplicity into a new legal form.
Finally, in the last paragraph of the review, Wood laments that I
did not "dip[] into" any volumes of the ratification debates.' He
grants that the creation of American federalism "involved a great deal
of intellectual debate" but then warns that "that debate did not take
place in the Constitutional Convention."' Few historians of the period
would make such a sweeping, and implausible, claim about the
Constitutional Convention. Moreover, the book contains several
references to the ratification debates in the form of the Federalist
essays, as well as John Marshall's comments on the floor of the
Virginia convention, when the future chief justice urged his colleagues
to embrace the possibility of a system of inferior federal courts.
Taking up Wood's suggestion that the "real" intellectual debate did
not take place in the Constitutional Convention, however, I must
disagree. Indeed, given Wood's insistence on the importance of the
ratification debates, his outright dismissal of the Constitutional
Convention is puzzling. In Part II.B, I discuss the Convention's
retooling of received political philosophy into a new vision of political
authority and finally into a workable legal system -surely the product
of intellectual debate.
Now let us move to more substantive points.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS
Although Wood raises a number of issues, I address them under
two broad themes: (1) localism and popular sovereignty, and
(2) judicial review and the Supremacy Clause.
A.

Localism and Popular Sovereignty

The first third of Wood's review could easily have been titled
"The Triumph of William Blackstone" based on the almost
evangelical zeal with which Wood not only adopts that jurist's views
of sovereignty but also marshals them against the American Founders
to show that they could not possibly have held any dissenting views of
the proper arrangement of governmental authority. Wood's critique

22
23

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 732 (cited in note 3).
Id.

The University of Chicago Law Review

740

[78:733

contains three claims: first, that the colonists' dominant political
experience centered on "bottom up," locally based political autonomy
at the level of the town and the county; second, that this localism was
distinct from what he might term the "top down" exercise of British
imperial authority over the colonies, as well as the "bottom up"
resistance from the colonies against metropolitan authority; and third,
that only his species of localism is significant for the development of
federalism. This localism, he argues, stemmed from centuries of the
"long English heritage of local autonomy" and came to fruition in the
Founders' embrace of popular sovereignty as the basis of American
government.24 For Wood, localism was both sufficient and necessary to
bring about federalism. From this view follows the conclusion that the
theoretical shift of the 1780s was a mere formalization of localism in
the form of a fundamental commitment to popular sovereignty.
Federalism, then, was nothing more than the extension of the
colonists' experience of localism, a theoretical fillip to the more
important reality of rule by the people.
In laying out this view, Wood omits at least half the story of
federalism's origins. Of course the colonists' experience with local
autonomy profoundly shaped their political and constitutional
worldview by giving them a deeply ingrained sense of governmental
power as susceptible to the people's control. Nothing in my book
disputes this point, and indeed the book takes as given the importance
of these antecedent ideas of local control. In my discussion of the
early American confederations, I explain that the articles of
confederation among the four colonies of the New England
Confederation of 1643 "did not refer to the Crown, Parliament, or any
other metropolitan authority. The recitation of authority that began
the document referred only to the member colonies and spoke in the
language

of

Calvinist

voluntarism."'

Assertions

of

popular

sovereignty dating from the English Civil War clearly undergirded
these colonists' powerful sense of themselves as possessing the power
to establish a government.'
As the book makes clear, the earliest efforts at colonial
confederation took place within the first three decades of English
settlement in mainland North America, and each of these efforts
proceeded from the premise that the colonists themselves possessed
Id at 711.
LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 20-22 (cited in note 1).
26 See, for example, William Clarke, The Putney Debates (Oct 28, 1647), in C.H. Firth, ed,
1 The Clarke Papers 226, 301 (Camden Society 1891) (quoting Thomas Rainborow, a colonel in
Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army, as saying "every man that is to live under a Governement
ought first by his owne consent to putt himself under that Governement").
24
2
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the power to enter into leagues with other colonies. My argument,
therefore, emphasizes both the colonists' belief in the legitimacy of
their own locally based constitutional power (what Wood terms
"bottom up" political authorityn) and their intuition that this power
could reach outside one's own colony to form supracolonial
associations with one's neighbor colonies. This latter point is the
logical extension of a theory of "bottom-up" political authority. It is
what happens when several politically and legally autonomous units
join together to create another level of governmental authority.
But such connections are simply ignored in Wood's account.
Wood's strange assertion that the book "never acknowledges that the
idea of parceling out authority from the bottom up -creating different
levels of government-was very much a part of American experience
from the beginning"' demonstrates this unwillingness to conceive of
local political autonomy as having any outward-looking consequences.
Where Wood sees local political autonomy, therefore, I see local
political autonomy as well as the desire within those localities to form
bonds, treaties, leagues, and confederations with other localities-that
is, the desire to experiment with multiple levels of governmental
authority. Colonial legal practice and theory were thus much messier
than Wood's account suggests, and provincial thinkers engaged for
decades in efforts to reconcile competing sources of authority: local
law and imperial regulation, ordinary legislation and higher law.29
Wood baldly asserts that a distinctly and exclusively local species
of authority was the only recognized source of legal and political
power in the early colonial period. "During the first generation of
settlement in the New World, the Crown, which in England was
considered the source of all local authority, for all intents and
purposes simply did not exist," he states." Quite the contrary.

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 711 (cited in note 3).
Id at 715.
29 The argument that British North Americans consciously engaged in a decades-long
effort to reconcile competing sources of law, especially positivist versus higher-law-based
accounts of ultimate legal authority, received scholarly attention in the middle of the twentieth
century and has recently become the subject of renewed examination by legal historians. For two
influential accounts, see Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American
Plantations 614, 629-35 (Columbia 1950); J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English
Constitutional History 192-96 (Oxford 1961). For more recent investigations, see Philip
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 31-69, 283-326 (Harvard 2008); Daniel J. Hulsebosch,
Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalismin the Atlantic World,
1664-1830 75-144 (North Carolina 2005); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution:
ColonialLegal Cultureand the Empire 186-96 (Harvard 2004). See also R.H. Helnholz, Bonham's
Case, JudicialReview, and the Law of Nature, 1 J Legal Analysis 325, 331 (2009).
30 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 712 (cited in note 3).
27
28
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Consider the opening lines of the Mayflower Compact, one of the
earliest acts of political self-determination by a group of colonists:
In the Name of God, Amen. We, whose Names are underwritten, the Loyal Subjects of our Dread Soveraign Lord King
James. . .. Having undertaken for the glory of God, and
advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our
K[i]ng and Countrey, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the
Northern parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and
mutually, in the presence of God and one another, Covenant and
Combine our selves together into a Civil Body Politick."
The spirit of local authority, of direct communion between the
people aboard the Mayflower and their God, suffuses this famous
founding document. But that covenant with divine authority (the
political equivalent of Luther's call for Protestants to interpret biblical
text for themselves) was combined with a direct grant of temporal
political authority from James I. Indeed, the Mayflower separatists'
references to the Stuart king were more than early modern
boilerplate, a throat-clearing exercise at the beginning of an official
document. The compact not only described the Mayflower passengers
as loyal subjects of the monarch, it also listed "the Honour of our
King and Countrey" as one of the motivations for their venture.
These English settlers claimed the power to combine themselves in a
civil body politic, and they understood that body politic to exist in an
ongoing relationship with Crown, country, and deity.
The emphasis on predicate sources of political and legal power
that was so important for early settlers came to preoccupy many
colonists in the middle of the eighteenth century. At that point, the
dual tensions in colonial legal thought between, first, positive legislation
and higher law, and second, localism and membership in the empire,
became manifest. Perhaps no colonial commentator better illustrates
British North Americans' efforts to reconcile these competing
commitments than James Otis. In a widely circulated 1764 treatise that
laid bare the colonists' struggle to articulate a coherent constitutional
vision, Otis offered forceful arguments for the ostensibly incompatible
theories of popular sovereignty, parliamentary sovereignty, natural law,
colonial rights, and colonial subjection to Parliament. "[Slupreme
absolute power is originally and ultimately in the people," Otis stated. 32
31 Mayflower Compact (1620), reprinted in Donald S. Lutz, ed, Colonial Origins of the
American Constitution:A Documentary History 31, 31-32 (Liberty Fund 1998).
32 James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), reprinted in
Bernard Bailyn, ed, 1 Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750-1776 408,424 (Belknap 1965)
(emphasis omitted).
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This strong endorsement of popular sovereignty was followed by a
robust declaration that took a similar line to that of Otis's
contemporary, Blackstone: "The power of Parliament is uncontrollable
but by themselves, and we must obey. They only can repeal their own
acts.",3 Yet Otis evidently also believed that there were limits to
Parliament's uncontrollable authority: "The Parliament cannot make
2 and 2, 5: omnipotency cannot do it."" Where did these limits come
from? Otis then argued for a higher-law boundary on parliamentary
authority. "There must be in every instance, a higher authority, viz.,
GOD. Should an act of Parliament be against any of his natural laws,
which are immutably true, their declaration would be ... void."" The
remedy for any such violations, however, appeared to lie with the
legislature: "and so it would be adjudged by the Parliament itself
when convinced of their mistake."" As for the colonies' relationship
to Parliament, Otis stated that "as over subordinate governments the
Parliament of Great Britain has an undoubted power and lawful
authority to make acts . . . that, by naming them, shall and ought to be
equally binding as upon the subjects of Great Britain within the
realm."" Along with these duties to Parliament, however, the
colonists could claim "all the natural, essential, inherent, and
inseparable rights of our fellow subjects in Great Britain."38
What is one to make of this welter of apparently conflicting
arguments in Otis's writings? The principal lesson to be drawn is that
while the experience of local authority and the theory of popular
sovereignty were significant aspects of provincial law and politics,
other elements of the colonists' experience and thought were at least
as important for the emergence of American federalism. As
demonstrated by Otis's anguished attempt to cobble together the
disparate elements of post-Glorious Revolution English political
theory, higher-law limitations on legislative power, and the colonists'
experience of local government, British North Americans clearly felt
that their commitment to local political autonomy did not offer
complete answers to some of the most pressing issues of colonial law
and politics. Many colonial commentators therefore brooded on the
preliminary question of establishing the legal legitimacy of the
fledgling colonies as well as the later question of placing mature
colonies with thriving local political institutions within the framework
33
34

35
36
37
38

Id at 448.
Id at 454.
Id (emphasis omitted).
Otis, Rights of the British Colonies at 454 (cited in note 32).
Id at 442.
1d at 444.
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of a larger empire that was increasingly committed to parliamentary
sovereignty.
Here my disagreement with Wood becomes manifest. Wood
argues that the colonies were always federal, and he understands
"federal" to mean a foundation of local political authority." The early
settlers, he maintains, "were experiencing federalism without any
ideological justification whatsoever."' Because this always-existing
federalism was based on "bottom up" political authority from the
people in the towns and counties, it never presented a challenge to
orthodox British political theory's growing aversion to imperium in
imperio. Indeed, Wood claims, it was precisely this deep-seated
commitment to localism and popular sovereignty that permitted the
colonists-and later the Founders-to satisfy the demands of
Blackstone, Knox, and others for unitary, undivided sovereignty.
Unitary sovereignty was there all along, vested in the people, so at the
moment of crisis, "the people" simply took over from Parliament to
become the new single sovereign in American theory. The colonists,
Wood insists repeatedly, could not "evade the logic of sovereignty"
put forth by Blackstone and Knox; that logic was just too powerful.4 1
"In the end," Wood states, the Massachusetts House of
Representatives "accepted the logic of the Blackstonian idea of
sovereignty, which is what all the colonial leaders eventually did."42
Indeed, we are told, "[o]ne by one, all of the leading RevolutionariesJohn Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexander
Hamilton- accepted the logic of sovereignty but relocated it in their
separate legislatures."

"Accepted the logic"? This does not read as the detached
analytical tone of the historian; this is the language of the advocate.
With such locutions as "accepted the logic" and "evade the logic,"
Wood suggests that Blackstone's and Knox's arguments were the only
acceptable logic, and that the colonists' early attempts to resist it were
just foolish or misguided. If Wood's narrative is based on an
unchanging commitment to local autonomy that, in the form of
popular sovereignty, simply took the place of Parliament and left the
rest of British political and legal orthodoxy unchanged, one wonders
whether he believes that anything new emerged from American
thought in the 1770s and 1780s. Was the creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787, really nothing more than the clever recasting of
39
40
41
42
43

Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 712-13 (cited in note 3).
Id at 713.
Id at 721.
Id at 721-22.
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 723 (cited in note 3).
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a preexisting colonial commitment to local governance in order to
satisfy a problem of domestic British political theory? In other words,
is Wood taking the position that the unitary view of sovereignty was
the correct one, and therefore that the colonists must have accepted it
in order to avoid being "wrong on the law"?"
Strangely enough, Wood's answer to these questions appears to
be yes. 5 He rejects arguments that the colonists began in the 1770s to
move away from a belief in unitary sovereignty and toward a theory
of multiple authorities. "They were, of course, doing nothing of the
sort," he states." The force of the Blackstonian argument compelled
the colonists to relocate sovereignty to the several colonial
legislatures. And lest one think this represented a change, Wood
offers the following: "This was an intellectual adjustment, not a
substantive one, as Americans had usually acted as if their separate
colonial legislatures were miniature parliaments."47
But in fact an intellectual and a substantive adjustment-a
moment of creativity-was exactly what the colonists were engaged in
during the 1770s and 1780s. (Here one must note how odd such a
statement is from a scholar who once criticized "behaviorist
historians" for treating ideas as "merely a covering superstructure for
the underlying and determinative social reality."") Wood's claim that
the Blackstone-Knox theory of unitary sovereignty was both
descriptively accurate and the only acceptable normative view at the
time attributes a totalizing, hegemonic power to their ideas that is not
borne out in the sources. Indeed, Wood's implication that Blackstone
and Knox were correct-so much so that attempts by the colonists to
refute them amounted to "evad[ing]" their logic or attempting to "get
away with denying Parliament's authority to tax them"' 9 -risks
running afoul of the fallacy Barbara Black described as "refusing to
call a Revolution a revolution."'
4

44 See Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U Pa
L Rev 1157, 1157-58 (1976) (critiquing inquiries framed in this way).
45 The unwavering belief in a single, correct "logic of sovereignty" that Wood displays in his
review stands in sharp contrast to his previous critiques of scholars whom he viewed as producing
"briefs" for the arguments of actors that they studied. See Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the
Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm & Mary Q 628, 632-33 (1987) ("It may be a necessary fiction
for lawyers and jurists to believe in a 'correct' or 'true' interpretation of the Constitution in order to
carry on their business, but we historians have different obligations and aims.").
46 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 722 (cited in note 3).
47
Id.
48 Gordon S. Wood, Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution, 23 Wm & Mary Q 3,
8 (1966).
49 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 722 (cited in note 3).
50 See Black, 124 U Pa L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 44).
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The colonists did not argue for divided sovereignty, Wood insists,
because they could not. I maintain that the colonists did argue for
divided sovereignty, and that understanding how they managed to do
so, and how they drew that new idea from familiar ideas and
experiences, is what ought to matter to an intellectual historian.
Popular sovereignty was certainly part of the creativity of the period,
but the equally significant achievement of these thinkers lay in their
reconception of the relationships among institutions and governments
themselves.
Judicial Review and the Supremacy Clause

B.

In the book, I argue that the debate in the Constitutional
Convention-in particular, the rejection of Madison's negative and
the adoption of judicial review under the Supremacy Clause and
Article III-was a vital moment for the emergence of American
federalism." In the course of these discussions, including Madison's
own research and writing in preparation for the Convention and the
ratification debates, federal thought was translated from a diffuse
array of theories about, and experiences of, governmental multiplicity
to a set of operative legal categories.52 Two important and related
developments during the Convention characterized this translation:
first, an effort to formalize the subject-matter, rather than functional,
division of authority among levels of government that had first been
articulated by the colonists in the 1760s; and second, a shift in
emphasis from legislative to judicial remedies for state misbehavior
and parochialism, which many delegates believed posed the greatest
threat to the confederation.
The subject-matter-based division of governmental authority
underpinned many provisions of the Constitution, in particular
Article I, § 8 (setting forth Congress's enumerated powers) and
Article I, § 10 (prohibiting the states from regulating certain subjects)."
For different reasons, Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton,
Gouverneur Morris, and John Marshall, and even skeptics such as
Thomas Jefferson, shared the sense that an initial allocation of power
between the states and the general government was essential to
avoiding the old imperium in imperio problem.' The provisions of
Article I, § 10, all of which were addressed to the state legislatures,
were a first step in this project. But the ultimate weapon against messy

51
52
53

54

LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 158-66 (cited in note 1).
Id at 160.
See id at 171.
See id at 179-213.
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overlap between state and federal levels of government was to be the
courts." In response to Madison's negative, Jefferson argued for "an
appeal from the state judicature to a federal court, in all cases where
the act of Confederation controled the question." Would not a judicial
mechanism such as this, he inquired, "be as effectual a remedy, &
exactly commensurate to the defect?""
Just as many critics of imperial regulation had argued in the
1760s, the key theoretical move was not to find a new unitary
sovereign but to conceive that it was possible-even desirable-for
one polity to contain multiple sovereigns, as long as each was
prescribed a specific regulatory domain in which to exercise its power.
In the 1760s, the distinction between internal and external regulation
was one important mode by which the colonists began to think
through subject-matter-based authority. The contribution of the
debates in the 1780s was to support this newly legitimized structure of
legislative multiplicity with a set of institutions designed to police the
boundaries between the power of the states and that of the general
government. These institutions were, of course, courts in general (all
of which were bound by the Supremacy Clause), and federal courts in
particular (as envisioned by the Federalists and enacted by the First
Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789"). The Constitution drew the
lines of authority and also established the institutions that would
monitor these boundaries in perpetuity.
Wood resists the notion that the defeat of Madison's negative
was a turning point in the development of federalism, as well as the
related idea that the defeat of the negative had anything to do with
the eventual adoption of judicial review of state courts' decisions or
state legislatures' acts. Again, Wood insists that the Founders'
experience of popular sovereignty was the central-indeed, the onlyforce motivating their decisions during the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution. He reads the argument for judicial review offered in
Federalist 78 as Hamilton "simply trying to establish and enhance the
independence and authority of the judiciary against the mistrusted
state legislatures.""
This interpretation of Federalist 78 demonstrates the limits of an
approach that reads the Founding period entirely, and only, through
the lens of popular sovereignty. Hamilton justified judicial review as
55 See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 163 (cited in note 1).
56 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 20, 1787), reprinted in Robert
A. Rutland, et al, eds, 10 The Papersof James Madison 63, 64 (Chicago 1977).
57

1 Stat 73.

58
59

See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 165 (cited in note 1).
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 731 (cited in note 3).
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the mechanism by which the courts would serve as "an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority."' Institutions mattered to Hamilton. The point of
Federalist 78 was not only to establish the legitimacy of the courts by
linking them to the people but also to vest the judiciary with ultimate
guardianship of the Constitution.
In making this argument, Hamilton offered a theoretical
justification not only for judicial review, but also for a view of judicial
supremacy that associated courts -in particular, the Supreme Court with the Constitution itself." Federalist 78 explicitly linked the
judiciary with the people, but the larger connection that Hamilton
made was the one between the judiciary and the Constitution as the
preeminent source of higher law. "No legislative act [ ] contrary to the
constitution can be valid," Hamilton wrote.' Such a principle
supposes that
where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the
judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former.
They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws,
rather than by those which are not fundamental.
To be sure, he went on to say that to argue otherwise would be "to
affirm ... that the representatives of the people are superior to the

people themselves."' The people and the Constitution were deeply
intertwined. But the invocation of the Constitution as both a source of
governmental power and as the government itself was new in the
1780s and was therefore not part of the seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century colonial experience that Wood argues was the
fount of American federalism.
Hamilton's vision of judicial review thus aimed to solve the
puzzle that had tormented James Otis: Were there any limits to the
power of an omnipotent legislature? If so, those limits must come
from a higher source of law. Otis had worked through the arguments
and come to the ambiguous conclusion that although Parliament's
Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist521, 525 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
Contemporary observers as well as modem scholars have read Federalist 78 as making
the case for judicial supremacy. See, for example, Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution186 (Vintage 1996) (noting Anti-Federalists' critique
of Federalist 78 as giving the federal judiciary "a final power of interpreting the meaning of the
Constitution and the laws").
62 Federalist 78 (Hamilton) at 524 (cited in note 60).
63 Id at 525.
6
Id at 524.
60
61
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authority must be limited by natural law (it could not make 2 plus 2
equal 5), it was not clear what, if any, institution could enforce these
limits against the legislature. Hamilton provided a theoretical and
practical solution to this problem: the legislature was not sovereign;
the people were sovereign. And the institution that would enact this
amorphous popular sovereignty was the judiciary. Popular sovereignty
was certainly important to Hamilton, but the idea of the Constitution
as higher law in and of itself was beginning to take on normative
power.' While Otis had struggled to articulate the means by which
"God and nature" could provide real limits on Parliament, rather than
simply leaving its subjects waiting in the hope that Parliament would
suddenly be "convinced of [its] mistake,"6 Hamilton gave the ethereal
Constitution concrete force by vesting the courts with the institutional
responsibility for guarding and carrying out the Constitution in the
here and now. Courts, therefore, would police the actions of the
legislatures to ensure that fleeting majorities could not damage the
perpetual Constitution. By standing in for the Constitution, courts
would also provide a way out of the head-to-head conflict between
legislatures that had for decades elicited charges of imperium in
imperio. The Constitution was understood to embody the people, but
for Hamilton and his fellow Federalists, it was also a source of law and
a roadmap for dividing governmental authority.
I therefore agree with what many scholars have long taken to be
one of the central arguments in Wood's Creation of the American
Republic: that the shift from legislative to popular sovereignty around
1787-1789, as described in Federalist 78, helped Americans finally to
break free of their long-established fears of imperium in imperio." But
I do not agree with the Wood of this review, insofar as he insists that
Federalist 78 was nothing more than a restatement of a decades-old
commitment to "bottom up" political authority. British North
Americans certainly had experimented with local autonomy for
decades, but they had also conducted a long struggle to reconcile their
commitment to localism with their mutually incompatible beliefs in
legislative sovereignty and higher-law limits on legislatures. With the
negative, Madison attempted to graft a key element of imperial
practice - hierarchical

legislative

review-onto

the

two-tiered

structure of the Confederation. Madison's proposal thus echoed the
65 Consider Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiographyof the People Themselves and Popular
Constitutionalism,81 Chi Kent L Rev 813, 817 (2006) (noting that for both Wood and Bernard
Bailyn, "the emergence of the idea of a Constitution as embodying fundamental law is one of the
paramount achievements of the American Revolution").
66 Otis, Rights of the British Colonies at 446 (cited in note 32).
67 Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 372-89 (cited in note 4).
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debates of the 1760s and 1770s, which focused exclusively on the
relationship between legislatures (there, the colonial assemblies and
Parliament; in the 1780s, the state legislatures and Congress). The
delegates' rejection of the negative, followed immediately by their
taking up a draft provision directing that "the Judiciaries of the
several States" would be "bound" by "the supreme law" of the United
States, signaled that the institutional focus of federal thought was
shifting from legislatures to courts."
This is not to say, however, that judicial review was entirely novel
in the 1780s. On the contrary: a large body of scholarship dating from
the early twentieth century, and recently updated with nuanced
additions to the historiography, makes clear that judicial reviewmeaning the ability of courts to pass on the validity of statutes-was a
long-established practice in English and Anglo-American law.'
Wood's claim that judicial review did not emerge until decades after
the Founding echoes an old strain of Marbury-worship in
constitutional law scholarship, but it is simply not supported by the
evidence, and modern historiography has decidedly rejected this
view.' Many decades before Marbury v Madison" and Fletcher v
Peck' established the Supreme Court's power to invalidate acts of
Congress and state laws, Anglo-American lawyers and statesmen
believed that courts had the power to strike down-or, in more

68 Wood notes that this draft version of what became the Supremacy Clause was introduced
by Luther Martin, who opposed the creation of inferior federal courts. Wood seems to intend this
observation as evidence that Martin's proposal could not possibly have been made with judicial
review in mind. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6 and in a forthcoming article, however, opponents of
federal courts frequently embraced the requirement that state court judges be "bound" by federal
law because the ambiguity of the phrase arguably left some authority in the hands of state judges.
See LaCroix, Ideological Origins at 196 (cited in note 1). See also Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists,
Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 L & Hist Rev *5-6 (forthcoming 2012), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1558612 (visited Apr 16,2011).
69 See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council at 523-52 (cited in note 29); Julius Goebel Jr,
1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 50
(Macmillan 2d ed 1971); William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The
Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U Pa L Rev 1166, 1166-68
(1972); Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire at 28-31 (cited in note 29); Bilder, The Transatlantic
Constitution at 186-87 (cited in note 29); Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty at 179 (cited in
note 29). See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New
Contexts, 49 Stan L Rev 1031 (1997).
70 Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 1 (Yale 2d ed 1986)
(asserting that the Constitution solidified the duties of Congress and the President but that Chief
Justice John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v Madison "summoned [the judiciary] up out of the
constitutional vapors"), with Rakove, 49 Stan L Rev at 1036 (cited in note 69) (criticizing
Bickel's "dramatic theory of the Pallas-Athena birth of judicial review" by rooting judicial
review in Article VI and citing its long historical record).
71 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
72 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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modest terms, to recognize the voidness of-laws that did not
conform to the fundamental law of the land. As Philip Hamburger
observes, "Long before Americans declared their independence,
many English lawyers understood that the law made by the people,
their 'constitution,' was of higher authority and obligation than other
human law in their jurisdiction."" Although the idea remained vague,
it was certainly familiar to many educated British North Americans,
especially those present at the Constitutional Convention.74
As the debate over Madison's negative demonstrates, the
primary focus of the discussion about judicial review in the 1780s was
the Supreme Court's review of state legislative acts and state court
decisions, not review of acts of Congress. The delegates' rejection of
the negative, followed later that day by their adoption of the draft
Supremacy Clause, marked a decisive shift from decades-long debates
about which legislature was supreme to a reliance on courts as
referees charged with ensuring that each legislature stayed within its
proper subject-matter domain. "From this point on," Larry D.
Kramer observes, "the delegates assumed the existence of judicial
review over state laws in their deliberations."" It is therefore difficult
to exaggerate the importance of the judiciary for the creation of
American federalism. Indeed, in the early nineteenth century, the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the review of state court
decisions by the Supreme Court, became a major battleground for
competing views of federalism." Wood's insistence on popular
sovereignty as the single causal mechanism for the development of
federalism is misguided. As Federalist 78 demonstrates, popular
sovereignty was a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for judicial
review." The move to judicial review, and the adoption of the

73 Hamburger, Law and JudicialDuty at 17 (cited in note 29). Hamburger continues: "Not
merely the arrangement of government, this sort of constitution was the most fundamental part
of the law of the land, and although many men questioned its application to Parliament, many
others understood it to limit Parliament and thus to render any unconstitutional government act
unlawful and void." Id.
74 The assumption that courts could invalidate legislation was evident in Gouverneur
Morris's statement at the Convention that "[a] law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in
the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law." Max
Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787 28 (Yale rev ed 1934).
75 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review 75 (Oxford 2004) (positing that Luther Martin introduced the Supremacy Clause
following defeat of Madison's negative because, as a proponent of states' rights, he wanted to
gain support for defeating the negative by offering a palatable alternative).
76 See generally LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction (cited in
note 68).
77 In a system of parliamentary sovereignty, such as Britain's after the Glorious
Revolution, judicial review of legislative acts was by definition impossible. See Hamburger, Law
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Supremacy Clause, Article III, and § 8 and § 10 of Article I, was the
key moment in which Americans translated multiplicity into operative
legal categories.
III. THEORY
Perhaps even more troubling than the tone and the substantive
arguments in Wood's review is his view of the role of ideas in history
and historiography. Wood creates a stark dichotomy between ideas
and experience. In stating that "these early settlers were experiencing
federalism without any ideological justification whatsoever," and in
relentlessly creating an opposition between the colonists' "experience
with governmental multiplicity" on the one hand and the English
"idea of sovereignty" on the other, Wood in essence challenges all
historians to choose either ideas or experience as causal forces.'
Wood charges that I "never make[] clear why ideas were more
important than institutions and the day-to-day political experience of
the colonists."' My response is that Wood never explains why we
must choose between the two. In a book titled The Ideological Origins
of American Federalism, one cannot be surprised that the argument
does not contain extensive discussion of economic, cultural, or social
explanations for the emergence of federalism. My book discuses the
ideological origins of American federalism, not the experiential or
social origins of American federalism. Wood, however, seems to
believe not only that ideology and social practices are mutually
exclusive categories, but that social practices are the dominant causal
force for historical actors and therefore should be the dominant
explanatory factor for historians.
Let us take the first of Wood's statements quoted above as an
example. After discussing the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut" as
an instance of local self-determination in the early colonial years, he
concludes, "All of this reinforced the view that authority was created
by the pooling together of local power from below. In other words,
these early settlers were experiencing federalism without any
ideological justification whatsoever."" Can Gordon Wood, the chief
exponent of the concept of republicanism that so influenced much of
and Judicial Duty at 238-39 (cited in note 29) (explaining that judges could not hold acts of
Parliament unlawful because Parliament was, in theory, the highest common law court).
78
Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 708, 713 (cited in note 3).
79
Id at 708.
80 FundamentalOrders of Connecticut, 1639, reprinted in Jon L. Wakelyn, ed, 1 America's
Founding Charters:Primary Documents of Colonial and Revolutionary Era Governance 125, 125
(Greenwood 2006).
81 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 713 (cited in note 3) (emphasis added).
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American political and legal historiography in the late twentieth
century, really be saying that "experience" exists as an entirely
distinct and neutral category of analysis, separate from any suspicious
"ideological justification," and that the presence of any discernible set
of social practices means that ideology was irrelevant? Surely by now
political, intellectual, and legal historians are sophisticated enough to
understand that both social practices and ideology are importantindeed, that they are related and mutually constitutive categories, not
that social practices are the important base and ideology merely
superstructure. Yet reading Wood's review, one wonders whether he
has turned out to be a Beardian after all.'
The specifics of his claim seem to be as follows: The early
colonists' belief in their own political and constitutional capacity
meant that upon arrival in the New World, they were able
immediately to set about organizing their own towns and counties,
and then colonies and confederations of colonies. From the early
decades of the seventeenth century, local political authority was part
of everyday life for North American settlers from the British Isles; we
know this because they did in fact leave behind documents in which
they created towns, counties, colonies, and confederations. Historians
do not need to look much further than these documents. In fact, they
should not look any further; they should simply take the documents as
they are and draw from them the only conclusions that contemporary
actors could have drawn: English settlers are compulsive drafters of
fundamental political and legal writings; some towns to the north of
Long Island Sound have joined themselves into the colony of
Connecticut; local units of government are powerful.
With this rich experience of local self-determination- which,
again, my book does not dispute but takes as a given-to draw from,
the colonists never needed any sort of fancy ideology to justify what
they were up to. They simply acted, and their actions were all the
evidence we need of what their motivating ideas were. Accounts that
emphasize ideas, and that term some ideas "ideologies" when they
take on wider political and legal force, and when they both grow out
of a particular set of political and legal conditions and feed back into

8
See generally Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States (Transaction 1988) (originally published 1913) (arguing that economic rather than
ideological factors provided the motivating force behind the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution). See also Forrest McDonald, Book Review, Colliding with the Past, 25 Rev Am
Hist 13, 13-14 (1997) ("To Beard, the establishment of the Constitution was something of a
counter-revolution, engineered by affluent but suffering holders of personal as opposed to real
property.... Its design was to reverse the radical democratic tendencies the Revolution had
unleashed.").
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politics and law to reframe the landscape of possibilities, are
anathema to the view that Wood puts forth.
The trouble with such a view is that it suggests that the people
who were actually having these experiences-colonists in Hartford
who helped to draft the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut,
passengers aboard the Mayflower who decided not to be deterred by
the mismatch between their patent and the location of their landfallwere not thinking about them. The early settlers who, Wood argues,
experienced federalism without any ideological justification might
have been just mimetic automatons acting on the premise that local
units of government are powerful. But Wood is not playing fair here.
In order for the practice of localism to become the idea of popular
sovereignty that bears so much weight in his interpretation,
contemporary actors must have thought about and attempted to make
sense of their experience. Popular sovereignty is, after all, an idea. To
argue otherwise would make popular sovereignty nothing more than a
post hoc analytical frame conjured by twentieth-century scholars, and
neither Wood nor I believes this to be the case.
Perhaps one reason for Wood's hostility to the ideological
explanation is simply that it postdates popular sovereignty, which had
been present since the earliest days of colonial settlement and which
he views as the source of late eighteenth-century American politics.
But of course the fact that local autonomy was present from the
beginning does not mean that it never changed, much less that
federalism was there from the beginning. In order to believe that
popular sovereignty was an idea that had meaning for seventeenthand eighteenth-century Americans, one must take those historical
actors seriously enough to believe that they might have been capable
of organizing their experiences conceptually. Otherwise, we might as
well all be historical materialists, arguing that forces and experiences
beyond individual control were responsible for structuring worldhistorical events."
But that is certainly not what I thought I had learned from the
Wood who wrote The Creation of the American Republic, Part One of
which is titled "The Ideology of Revolution."' Indeed, the binary
view of the distinction between ideas and experience that Wood's
review adopts contradicts some of his own most powerful work.
Throughout the review, he suggests that the colonial experience of
local autonomy was in some important sense "real," while the
83
See generally Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Kerr
1913) (N.I. Stone, trans) (originally published 1859); Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Economic
Interpretationof History (Gordian 1967) (originally published 1902).
84
Wood, Creationof the American Republic at 7-8 (cited in note 4).
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ideology of multiple authority that I posit was at most an emanation
from that reality and not in any important sense real on its own terms.
I know I am not alone in having been taught in graduate school that
Wood, along with Bernard Bailyn, brought the study of ideas back to
American political history after the profession's long dalliance with
the materialist and determinist explanations of scholars such as
Charles Beard.
In a 1966 article, Wood offered a powerful critique of early to
mid-twentieth-century Progressive historians such as Beard and Carl
Becker, whom he argued had "absorb[ed] the diffused thinking of
Marx and Freud and the assumptions of behaviorist psychology" and
thus "sought to explain the Revolution and the formation of the
Constitution in terms of socio-economic relationships and interests
rather than in terms of ideas."' The problem with the Progressive
historians' approach was that it treated ideas as "parcels of thought to
be distributed and used where they would do the most good," in
contrast to the more nuanced views of later scholars such as Bailyn,
who demonstrated "the autonomy of ideas as phenomena, where the
ideas operate, as it were, over the heads of the participants, taking
them in directions no one could have foreseen."' According to such a
methodology, Wood wrote, ideas are "more than indicators of
motives. They become as well objects for analysis in and for
themselves, historical events in their own right to be treated as other
historical events are treated."' For Wood, one important insight that
such an interpretation offered was that the Progressive historians'
distinction between rhetoric and reality, ideas and interests, was
illusory after all. "[T]he ideas, the rhetoric, of the Americans was
never obscuring but remarkably revealing of their deepest interests
and passions.... [T]heir rhetoric was never detached from the social
and political reality; and indeed it becomes the best entry into an
understanding of that reality."' One wonders what the author of those
words would have thought of the ideas-experience dichotomy put
forth in Wood's review.

85 Wood, 23 Wm & Mary Q at 7 (cited in note 48). See also Beard, An Economic
Interpretationof the Constitution at 7 (cited in note 82); Carl Lotus Becker, The History of Political
Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 22 (Wisconsin 1960) (originally published 1909);
Carl Becker, The Declarationof Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas 128-34
(Harcourt, Brace 1922).
86
Wood, 23 Wm & Mary Q at 8-10, 23 (cited in note 48).
87
Id at 21.
Id at 31 (arguing that the colonists' "repeated overstatements"-such as "incessant talk
88
of 'tyranny,"' "obsession with 'virtue,"' and "devotion to 'liberty"'-were ideas of "real
personal and social significance" based in their own experience rather than mere propaganda).
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Wood has not only misunderstood the substantive claims of my
book, but he and I have fundamentally different views of the
relationship between ideas and experience, and the associated
relationship between law and society. First, ideas and experience. My
argument is premised on the notion that social practices take on
meaning when contemporaries funnel them through an existing
framework of ideas, a process that frequently fundamentally alters
that framework. To adapt a line from David Armitage's study of the
British Empire, my intention is "not to expose beliefs about"
federalism "as either true or false, but rather to show the ways in
which the constitutive elements of various conceptions" about
federalism "arose in the competitive context of political argument.""
Ideas and experience, therefore, should be seen as existing in a
relationship of "relative autonomy."' Each is a distinct category, but
they are interrelated and mutually constitutive, such that one cannot
be understood without the other-either by contemporaries or by
later historians looking back at a given moment.
This view has important consequences for the study of legal and
constitutional thought. As Morton Horwitz observes, "no historian of
law can fail to recognize that legal consciousness in any particular
period is not simply the sum of those contemporary social forces that
impinge upon law. Law is autonomous to the extent that ideas are
autonomous, at least in the short run."" Wood's distinction between
experience and ideas, and his disdain for ideological explanations, is
simply untenable when applied to the study of the history of a legal
concept such as federalism. Unless Wood did not really mean it when
he stated that federalism is "a historically created conception that
changed through time as circumstances changed" rather than a
"transcendent idea standing outside of time and place,"' it is difficult
to understand his resistance to an ideological history-any ideological
history, it would seem-of federalism. Federalism was the subject of a
great deal of thought and discussion by lawyers, which may or may
not have reflected social practice. Once we accept the relative
autonomy of law, however, the difficulties with Wood's "mirror
theory" of law as merely the reflection of experience-and therefore
89 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire 5 (Cambridge 2000).
90 See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan L Rev 57, 100-01 (1984) ("[Legal
doctrines] can't be explained completely by reference to external politicallsocialleconomic factors.
To some extent they are independent variables in social experience and therefore they require
study elaborating their peculiar internal structures."). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 xiii (Harvard 1977).
91 Horwitz, Transformation of American Law at xiii (cited in note 90).
92 Wood, 78 U Chi L Rev at 708 (cited in note 3).
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of federalism as nothing more than the logical outcome of local
political autonomy-become evident.' It is not a meaningful critique
to say that the ideological account of federalism's origins does not
match the experiential account. While ideas and experience, and law
and social practice, are deeply interrelated, they are not the same
thing. In contrast to the mirror theory of law, the view of experience
and ideas as mutually constitutive recognizes that change in law and
change in social practice can and do take place at different rates. The
widespread political decentralization that characterized early colonial
America did not create a reality that law simply followed. Legal
thought drew from a variety of sources and influences, and as James
Otis's struggle illustrates, the intellectual path from local legislative
authority to the constitutionalization of federal law as the supreme
law of the land, binding on state judicial officers, was difficult to
navigate.
CONCLUSION
In his review, Wood sets forth more clearly than he has elsewhere
his view of the relationship between republicanism and federalism. For
Wood, republicanism -defined

above all as popular sovereignty-was

the proximate cause of the Revolution and the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution. On this view, the changes in late
eighteenth-century American political and legal theory can be
explained only and entirely by republican ideology, which in his
review is presented as the sum of the colonists' decades-long
experience of local autonomy. Federalism was simply an outgrowth of
this ideology, an application of the general principle of popular
sovereignty to the specific problem of the relationship between the
states and the general government.
My book is a history of the shift from multiplicity as a
problematic but deeply felt commitment of British North American
legal thought to federalism as the foundational constitutional value
behind a new legal and political regime. To be sure, the new regime
was a republic, and it therefore relied on republican ideas, among
them popular sovereignty. But the new regime was also federal, and it
therefore emerged from a diffuse array of responses, both theoretical
and experiential, to unitary sovereignty. Federalism was not just the
result of Americans finally internalizing the fear of imperium in
imperio and finding the language to describe their homegrown
remedy for it. Federalism was a rejection of that specter based on
93
See William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants,43
Am J Comp L 489, 491-96, 508 (1995) (describing and critiquing "mirror theories of law").
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both their experience with local government and their theory that
sovereignty could be divided along subject-matter lines, lines that
would in turn be policed by an institution with a special mandate to
monitor these boundaries.
If Wood charges me with originality because I view American
federalism as distinct from republicanism, I am happy to accept the
compliment.

